Abstract. While smooth exact potential games are easily characterized in terms of the crossderivatives of players'payo¤ functions, an analogous di¤erentiable characterization of ordinal or generalized ordinal potential games has been elusive for a long time. In this paper, it is shown that the existence of a generalized ordinal potential in a smooth game with multidimensional strategy spaces is crucially linked to the semipositivity (Fiedler and Pták, 1966) of a modi…ed Jacobian matrix on the set of interior strategy pro…les at which at least two …rst-order conditions hold. Our …ndings imply, in particular, that any generalized ordinal potential game must exhibit pairwise strategic complements or substitutes at any interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Moreover, provided that there are more than two players, the cross-derivatives at any interior equilibrium must satisfy a rather stringent equality constraint. The two conditions, which may be conveniently condensed into a local variant of the di¤erentiable condition for weighted potential games, are made explicit for sum-aggregative games, symmetric games, and two-person zero-sum games. For the purpose of illustration, the results are applied to classic games, including probabilistic all-pay contests with heterogeneous valuations, models of mixed oligopoly, and Cournot games with a dominant …rm.
Introduction
When a strategic game admits a potential, players' preferences may be conveniently summarized in a single objective function (Rosenthal, 1973; Monderer and Shapley, 1996a) . Potentials of di¤erent types have been identi…ed for a large variety of games. Moreover, the underlying methods have been found useful for the analysis of oligopolistic markets (Slade, 1994) , learning processes (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Young, 2004) , population dynamics (Sandholm, 2001 (Sandholm, , 2009 Cheung, 2014) , the robustness of equilibria (Frankel et al., 2003; Morris and Ui, 2005; Okada and Tercieux, 2012) , the decomposition of games (Candogan et al., 2011) , imitation strategies (Duersch et al., 2012) , dynamics in near-potential games (Candogan et al., 2013a (Candogan et al., , 2013b , the existence of Nash equilibrium (Voorneveld, 1997; Kukushkin, 1994 Kukushkin, , 2011 , solution concepts (Peleg et al., 1996; Tercieux and Voorneveld, 2010) , games with monotone best-response selections (Huang, 2002; Dubey et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010) , supermodular and zero-sum games (Brânzei et al., 2003) , and even issues in mechanism design (Jehiel et al., 2008) .
Both exact and ordinal variants of the concept have been considered in the literature. 1 In the case of …nite strategy spaces, complete characterizations are known for exact and (generalized) ordinal potential games. Exact potential games admit a convenient characterization also in the important class of smooth games, i.e., in the class of games with Euclidean strategy spaces and twice continuously di¤erentiable payo¤ functions. For instance, a smooth game with onedimensional interval strategy spaces admits an exact potential if and only if the Jacobian of that game, i.e., the matrix of cross-derivatives of players' payo¤ functions, is globally symmetric.
For the class of in…nite ordinal potential games, a useful characterization has been established by Voorneveld and Norde (1997) . Speci…cally, a game admits an ordinal potential if and only there are no weak improvement cycles and an order condition is satis…ed. 2 However, as far as we know, no di¤erentiable characterization has been available up to this point for the classes 1 For a real-valued function on the set of strategy pro…les to be an exact potential (a weighted potential), the di¤erence in a player's payo¤ resulting from a unilateral change of her strategy must equal precisely (up to a positive factor) the corresponding di¤erence in the potential. For a potential to be ordinal, any strict gain in a player's payo¤ resulting from a unilateral change of her strategy must be re ‡ected by a strict gain in the potential and, unless the ordinal potential is generalized, vice versa.
2 For a rigorous statement of this important result, we refer the reader to Voorneveld and Norde (1997) .
of ordinal or generalized potential games. This has been a highly undesirable situation because the ordinal notions are of considerable conceptual interest.
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The present paper addresses this long-standing issue by studying the local feasibility of a generalized ordinal potential in a small neighborhood of an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium (or, more generally, in a small neighborhood of any interior strategy pro…le at which at least two …rst-order conditions hold). 4 To this end, we consider an arbitrary cyclic path that is contained in a small open neighborhood of the equilibrium. In the simplest case, the path runs along the edges of a small rectangular box that contains the equilibrium at its center. In general, however, the path need not be centered, it may even be zig-zagging, crossing itself, or forming a complicated knot. By shrinking the path to in…nitesimal size, we identify conditions on the slopes of players'local best-response functions such that each player's payo¤ is strictly increasing over the respective edges of the path that re ‡ect her changes in strategy. Since a strict improvement cycle is impossible in a generalized ordinal potential game (Voorneveld, 1997) , this approach indeed delivers a set of tight necessary conditions for the existence of a generalized ordinal potential in a wide class of games with continuous strategy spaces.
For example, it will be recalled that a smooth n-player game with interval strategy spaces is a weighted potential game if and only if there exist positive weights w 1 > 0; :::; w n > 0 such that 5 w i @ 2 u i (x N ) @x j @x i = w j @ 2 u j (x N ) @x i @x j (i; j 2 f1; :::; ng; i 6 = j)
holds at any strategy pro…le x N . Below, it will be shown that, at any interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium x N of any smooth generalized ordinal potential n-player game, provided that crossderivatives do not vanish, there exist positive weights w 1 (x N ) > 0; :::; w n (x N ) > 0 such that
@x j @x i (i; j 2 f1; :::; ng; i 6 = j).
Thus, any smooth generalized ordinal potential game satis…es a local analogue of the global di¤erentiable property of a weighted potential game at any interior equilibrium. 6 Moreover, as will also be seen, this condition implies rather tight restrictions in speci…c classes of games. In this sense, a (partial) di¤erentiable characterization of generalized ordinal potential games with continuous strategy spaces is obtained.
The analysis starts by considering strict improvement cycles that involve two players only.
For this case, the existence of a generalized ordinal potential is shown to imply that the product of the slopes of any two players'mutual local best-response functions (or, more generally, the product of the corresponding cross-derivatives) at any interior regular equilibrium must be nonnegative. 7 Thus, borrowing the terminology familiar from contributions such as Bulow et al. (1985) , Amir (1996) , Dubey et al. (2006) , and Monaco and Sabarwal (2016) , we obtain as our …rst main necessary condition that the game must exhibit pairwise strategic substitutes or complements at any interior regular equilibrium. The strict improvement cycle, provided it can be constructed, may then run either clockwise or counterclockwise around the equilibrium, depending on whether the horizontal (vertical) player's local best-response function is strictly increasing (strictly declining) or strictly declining (strictly increasing). As an illustration of its usefulness, it will be shown that the criterion is tight in a class of probabilistic all-pay contests.
The criterion is then sharpened by considering strict improvement cycles that involve more than two players. In the abstract, the existence of a particular strict improvement cycle is shown to correspond to the semipositivity (Fiedler and Pták, 1966; Johnson et al., 1994) of a matrix that is constructed from the Jacobian by replacing all diagonal entries by zero and by multiplying all entries above the diagonal with negative one. 8 Exploiting the speci…c structure of the problem at hand, the semipositivity condition is then reformulated in more explicit 6 The assumption that cross-derivatives do not vanish is indeed needed. To see this, consider the two-player ordinal potential game with payo¤s u 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = (x 1 +x 2 ) 2 and u 2 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = (x 1 +x 2 ) 6 . Then, at any CournotNash equilibrium x N , the cross-derivatives are given by @ 2 u 1 (x N )=@x 2 @x 1 = 2 and @ 2 u 2 (x N )=@x 1 @x 2 = 0, in con ‡ict with relationship (2). 7 We call an interior Nash equilibrium regular if the local second-order conditions hold strictly at the equilibrium point. In a neighborhood of a regular Nash equilibrium, one may de…ne local best-response functions, which allows a more intuitive discussion of some of the …ndings of this paper. Apart from the expositional simpli…cation, however, the regularity assumption is not crucial for the analysis.
8 Semipositivity generalizes the concept of a P-matrix (Gale and Nikaidô, 1965) . The relevant elements of the theory of semipositive matrices will be reviewed in the next section.
terms, such as the invertibility of the modi…ed Jacobian and polynomial constraints on the slopes of players' local best-response functions. Moreover, useful additional conditions are derived by either renaming players, or by ‡ipping around individual strategy spaces (Vives, 1990; Amir, 1996) . In particular, this leads to our second main condition in the case of onedimensional strategy spaces, viz. a set of equality constraints that must be satis…ed by the slopes of players' local best-response functions (or alternatively, by the cross-derivatives of players' payo¤ functions) at any interior regular equilibrium of any generalized ordinal potential game with at least three players. The two main conditions are then combined and rephrased into the simple cross-derivative condition stated above.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries. The …rst main necessary condition is derived in Section 3. Section 4 deals with the general geometry of strict improvement cycles involving more than two players. Section 5 discusses the second main necessary condition. Speci…c classes of games are considered in Section 6. Section 7 discusses extensions. Section 8 concludes. All proofs have been relegated to an Appendix.
Preliminaries

Games with continuous strategy spaces
A game is de…ned by a set of players N = f1; :::; ng, a strategy space X i for each i 2 N , and a payo¤ function u i : X N X 1 ::: X n ! R for each i 2 N . The game will be called smooth (e.g., Vives, 1999) if X i is a subset of some Euclidean space and u i is twice continuously di¤erentiable in the interior of X N , for any i 2 N . For expositional simplicity, the analysis will subsequently focus on the case in which X i R for all i 2 N . 9 Clearly, under this condition, marginal payo¤s i @u i =@x i are well-de…ned in the interior of X N for all i 2 N .
By a (Cournot-Nash) equilibrium of a game , we mean a strategy pro…le x N (x 1 ; :::; x n ) 2 X N such that u i (x i ; x i ) u i (x i ; x i ) for any i 2 N and for any x i 2 X i , where x i = (x 1 ; :::; x i 1 ; x i+1 ; :::; x n ) is the pro…le comprised of the strategies chosen by the opponents of player i, so that x i 2 X i X 1 ::: X i 1 X i+1 ::: X n . An equilibrium x N of a smooth game will be called interior if x i is an interior point of X i for all i 2 N . At an interior equi- 9 The case of multi-dimensional strategy spaces will be dealt with in Section 7. librium x N , the …rst-order necessary condition associated with player i's optimization problem
An equilibrium x N will be called regular if, in addition,
Consider an interior regular equilibrium x N . Then, as a direct consequence of the implicit function theorem, the equation i (x i ; x i ) = 0 de…nes a continuously di¤erentiable function
We will refer to i ( ; x N ) as player i's local best-response function around x N . 10 For any other player j 6 = i, we will refer to
as the slope of player i's local best-response function with respect to player j.
Potentials and potential games
The following well-known de…nitions do not require di¤erentiability. 11 A game is an exact potential game if there exists a function P : X N ! R, referred to as an exact potential of , such that
for any i 2 N , x i 2 X i , b x i 2 X i , and x i 2 X i . A game is called a weighted potential game if there exist positive factors w 1 > 0; :::; w n > 0 as well as a function P : X N ! R, referred to as a weighted potential of , such that
for any i 2 N , x i 2 X i , b x i 2 X i , and x i 2 X i . Next, is an ordinal potential game if condition (6) in the de…nition of an exact potential game is replaced by
Finally, is a generalized ordinal potential game if (6) is replaced by the even weaker condition
In the latter two cases, the function P is called an ordinal potential or generalized ordinal potential, respectively, of the game . Any exact potential is a weighted potential, any weighted potential is an ordinal potential, and any ordinal potential is a generalized ordinal potential.
However, a generalized ordinal potential game need not, in general, be an ordinal potential game, an ordinal potential game need not, in general, be a weighted potential game, and a weighted potential game need not, in general, be an exact potential game.
Smooth exact potential games with intervals as strategy spaces may be conveniently characterized in terms of the cross derivatives of players'payo¤ functions.
Lemma 1 (Monderer and Shapley, 1996a) . Consider a smooth game in which strategy spaces are intervals. Then is an exact potential game if and only if
The extension of Lemma 1 to weighted potential games is immediate. However, as discussed in the Introduction, an analogous characterization for ordinal games, speci…cally geared toward the class of games with continuous strategy spaces, has apparently not been known so far.
A general necessary condition may be formulated in terms of the following concept. A strict improvement cycle for a game (of length L) is a …nite sequence of strategy pro…les
in X N with the property that, for any l = 0; :::; L 1, there is a player i (l) 2 N such that
We then have the following useful result.
Lemma 2 (Voorneveld, 1997) . A generalized ordinal game does not admit any strict improvement cycle.
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Strategic substitutes and complements
Let x N be an interior strategy pro…le (e.g., an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium) in a smooth game . Then, will be said to exhibit strategic complements (strategic substitutes) at x N if @u i (x N )=@x j @x i 0 ( 0) for any two players i and j with j 6 = i. Fix two players i and j with j 6 = i. We will say that exhibits strategic complements (strategic substitutes) between i and j
Finally, we will say that exhibits pairwise strategic complements or substitutes at x N if exhibits, for any two players i
and j with j 6 = i, either strategic complements between i and j at x N or strategic substitutes between i and j at x N .
Semipositivity
Consider a vector N = ( 1 ; :::; n ) T 2 R n , where the superscript T indicates transposition, as usual. We will write N > 0 ( N 0) if all entries of N are positive (nonnegative), i.e., if i > 0 ( i 0) for all i = 1; :::; n. The following de…nition goes back at least to Fiedler and Pták (1966) .
In the de…nition, we may obviously replace the weak inequality by a strict one, using a simple perturbation argument. Thus, semipositivity amounts to the condition that (the interior of) the convex cone generated by the columns of A intersects the positive orthant R n ++ = fz N 2 R n : z N > 0g. Along these lines, semipositivity may be seen to correspond to a straightforward feasibility condition in linear programming. 12 For games in which strategy spaces can be totally ordered, local potentials (Morris, 1999; Frankel et al., 2003; Morris and Ui, 2005; Okada and Tercieux, 2012) generalize exact potentials by requiring an inequality condition that relaxes equation (7) in several ways. Since Lemma 2 does not apply, this extension lies outside of our present focus. However, a characterization of local potential maximizers in smooth games can be found in Morris (1999, p. 28 ).
Call a square matrix A 2 R n n inverse nonnegative if its matrix inverse A 1 exists and all entries of A 1 are nonnegative. The following lemma provides a very useful recursive characterization of semipositivity.
Lemma 3 (Johnson et al., 1994) . A square matrix A 2 R n n is semipositive if and only if at least one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) A is inverse nonnegative;
(ii) there exists m 2 f1; :::; n 1g and a submatrix b A 2 R n m obtained from A via deletion of n m columns, such that all m m submatrices of b A are semipositive.
The …rst necessary condition
Statement of the result
In this section, we derive the following simple yet apparently not widely known condition that is necessary for the existence of a generalized ordinal potential in a game with continuous strategy spaces.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the smooth game admits a generalized ordinal potential. Then, at any regular interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium x N , necessarily
for any two players i 2 N and j 2 N with i 6 = j.
Thus, any generalized ordinal potential game with continuous strategy spaces necessarily exhibits pairwise strategic substitutes or complements at any interior regular equilibrium.
It is important to note that the respective slopes of the local best-response functions are required to satisfy the inequality only at the pro…le x N itself, rather than, say, in an open neighborhood of the equilibrium. This is not a weakness of our result but ultimately owed to the ‡exibility of the ordinal concept. In fact, as may be seen from the illustration given at the end of this section, there are examples of ordinal potential games (viz. symmetric contests)
for which the mutual cross-derivatives @ 2 u i (x N )=@x j @x i and @ 2 u j (x N )=@x i @x j have di¤erent signs almost everywhere on the set of strategy pro…les (viz. o¤ the hyperplane de…ned through (12) is certainly satis…ed at the unique equilibrium.
It is similarly important to note that, in games with more than two players, condition (12) requires only pairwise strategic complements or substitutes. Therefore, unless the game is sumaggregative (see Section 6 for a de…nition), the conclusion of Proposition 1 is less stringent than the property that the game exhibits either strategic complements or strategic substitutes at any interior regular equilibrium. Again, this should not come as a surprise because, e.g., ‡ipping
around the strategy space of one of three players, say, may certainly destroy the property of strategic complements or strategic substitutes, but does not change the property of being a generalized ordinal game.
The conclusion of Proposition 1 is quite immediate when actually admits an exact (or even weighted) potential. Indeed, in this case, Lemma 1 implies that
holds in the interior of X N . Therefore, at any regular interior equilibrium x N ,
consistent with Proposition 1.
For a less obvious example, consider the interesting class of multiplicatively separable aggregative games for which an ordinal potential has been constructed explicitly (Kukushkin, 1994; Nocke and Schutz, 2016) . Thus, assume that payo¤s admit the representation u i (x N ) = x i (x N ) for all i 2 N , where : X N ! R is an arbitrary twice continuously di¤erentiable function that does not depend on the player i. Then, at any interior regular equilibrium x N , player j's optimality condition implies
so that
Thus, noting the symmetry of the numerator in (18) with respect to i and j, we arrive at
However, if inequality (12) fails to hold for any two players at any regular interior equilibrium, then there cannot exist a generalized ordinal potential for . In particular, a smooth game with an interior regular equilibrium that exhibits, in the strategic interaction between two players, an increasing reaction curve for one player and a decreasing reaction curve for the other player is never a generalized ordinal potential game. A classic example is the mixed oligopoly model by Singh and Vives (1984) , in which one …rm chooses a price, and the other …rm chooses a quantity. Another famous example is quantity competition between a dominant …rm and several fringe …rms (Bulow et al., 1985) . Many further examples, taken from diverse areas such as law enforcement, business strategy, and citizen protests, for instance, can be found in Tombak (2006) and Monaco and Sabarwal (2016) .
Outline of proof
To understand why Proposition 1 holds true, consider Figure 1 . Here, keeping the strategy pro…le x i;j = (x 1 ; :::; x i 1 ; x i+1 ; :::; x j 1 ; x j+1 ; :::; x n ) …xed, player i's local best-response function i = i (x j ; x i;j ) around x N is strictly increasing in player j's strategy x j , and player j's local best-response function j = j (x i ; x i;j ) around x N is strictly decreasing in player i's strategy
, and the necessary condition fails. And indeed, for " > 0 small enough, the …nite sequence starting at the upper left corner and running clockwise around the square,
! (x i + "; x j "; x i;j ) ! (x i "; x j "; x i;j ) ! :::, constitutes a strict improvement cycle, as will be explained now. To start with, consider the strategy change corresponding to the upper side of the square. Then, with " small, player i's payo¤ is …rst increasing (over a longer section of the side) and then decreasing (over a shorter section of the side). Figure 1 . Constructing a strict improvement cycle involving two players.
The point to note is now that, as a consequence of smoothness of payo¤s at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, player i's payo¤ function along the upper side of the square may be approximated arbitrarily well by a parabola opening downwards, provided the square is small enough. As the parabola is symmetric around its peak, the payo¤ di¤erence for player i, when switching from strategy x i " to x i + ", will be overall positive. 13 Similar considerations apply to the remaining three sides of the square. In fact, at the bottom side, there is no trade-o¤ because player i's marginal payo¤ is always negative there. Thus, in sum, one may construct a strict improvement cycle that leads around the equilibrium. As seen in the previous section, however, this is incompatible with the existence of a generalized ordinal potential.
Discussion
Proposition 1 may be further strengthened by focusing on the conditions that are actually used in the proof. For example, the interiority assumption in Proposition 1 can be easily relaxed.
What matters is that those players that are involved in the strict improvement cycle use an interior strategy. Second, players that are not involved in the strict improvement circle may use any strategy, even a suboptimal one. 14 Further, the regularity assumption may be dropped entirely provided that the conditions on the slopes introduced above and later in the paper are replaced by the corresponding conditions on the cross-derivatives of players'payo¤ functions.
For instance, in a two-player game, the necessary condition that 12 (x N ) 21 (x N ) 0 holds at any regular interior equilibrium x N may be replaced by the somewhat more stringent, but also maybe less vivid condition that (
any interior (i.e., not necessarily regular) equilibrium x N . Thus, the regularity assumption is purely expositional. 15 Then, the restriction to one-dimensional strategy spaces can be easily relaxed, essentially because a …nite sequence that is a strict improvement cycle remains a strict improvement cycle when players are granted more strategic ‡exibility. In fact, as will be explained in Section 7, the existence of a generalized ordinal potential in a smooth game with multi-dimensional strategy spaces leads to implications that are much stronger than those discussed so far (because there is more freedom for constructing strict improvement cycles in higher dimensions). Next, the criterion applies more generally to any strategy pro…le at which the …rst-order conditions for all players are satis…ed. Thus, rather than a global maximum, the individual player's problem may have a local maximum, local minimum, or in ‡ection point at x N . Finally, the game actually need not be smooth. It su¢ ces that the payo¤ functions of the involved players are twice continuously di¤erentiable at the critical point under consideration.
However, no further strengthening of the results is possible from considering strategy pro…les that are not local equilibria between at least two players. The reason is that, if at most one player's marginal condition holds at some x N , then there are no strict improvement cycles locally at x N . To the contrary, it is then always feasible to construct locally an ordinal potential by exploiting the strict monotonicity of n 1 payo¤ functions. 16 Relatedly, the consideration of more complicated paths (in which players may move more than twice), does not lead to more stringent conditions than those reported in the present paper. Indeed, while it may indeed be easier to achieve a strict gain in payo¤ on a single non-centered path segment, shrinking the path down to in…nitesimal size necessarily leads to a system of linear inequalities on secondorder derivatives only (cf. also the proof of Lemma 4 given in the Appendix). However, as will be discussed later in the analysis, a simple search model actually covers all possible (nonzero) slope combinations consistent with the necessary conditions. Along these lines, the conditions identi…ed in the present paper will be seen to be actually equivalent to the absence of any local strict improvement cycle (de…ned by the requirement that it remains a strict improvement cycle even after being shrunk by any factor " 2 (0; 1) via a pantograph …xed at x N ). 
An illustration
In the n-player lottery contest with valuations V 1 > 0; :::; V n > 0, player i's payo¤ is given by
where we assume that X 1 = ::: = X n = [0; 1). 18 It follows from a general result of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) that this game has a unique (yet not necessarily interior) equilibrium
x N = (x 1 ; :::; x n ).
Rather than applying our criterion to the n-player equilibrium, we will consider an equilibrium in the two-player game between arbitrary players i 2 N and j 2 N with j 6 = i, assuming that all remaining players remain passive. This actually strengthens our criterion. 19 So consider 16 E.g., in the two-player case, if
is an ordinal potential in a small neighborhood of x N . Similar constructions can be used to cover the cases where either (i) there are more than two players, or (ii) the marginal payo¤s of all players are non-zero at x N . 17 Strict improvement cycles that are not local in this sense are discussed in the extensions section.
18 If x 1 + :::: + x n = 0, then we assume
2 X N such that the following conditions hold:
In the bilateral game between players i and j, equilibrium e¤orts are given by the well-known expressions (cf. Konrad, 2009 )
From
and an analogous inequality for player j, we see that the equilibrium is regular. Moreover, the slope of player i's local best-response function is given by
An analogous expression may be derived for player j. We therefore see that the necessary
or equivalently, if and only if V i = V j . Thus, if valuations are strictly heterogeneous in the sense that at least two valuations di¤er, then the n-player contest introduced above does not allow a generalized ordinal potential.
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On the other hand, the lottery contest with homogenous valuations V V 1 = ::: = V n belongs to the beforementioned class of multiplicatively separable aggregative ordinal potential games. Speci…cally, the function
20 As will becomes clear later, the same conclusion holds under the much more ‡exible assumptions of Dixit (1987) .
is an ordinal potential for the lottery contest in the interior of the strategy space. In that sense, our criterion is not only necessary but also su¢ cient in the considered class of contests. 
Strict improvement cycles involving more than two players
The role of semipositivity
In this section, we will discuss the geometry of strict improvement cycles that involve more than two players.
To …x ideas, the initial focus will be on a particular path in which players 1 through n consecutively raise their respective strategies, and subsequently lower their strategies, following the same order. Figure 2 illustrates a path of this kind for the case of three players. In contrast to the case of cycles that involve two players only, it turns out that more stringent necessary conditions are obtained when allowing for a rectangular-shaped box with edges that are not necessarily of equal length. An analysis of the conditions necessary and su¢ cient for the described path to constitute a strict improvement cycle leads to the following observation.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the smooth game admits a generalized ordinal potential. Then, at any regular interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium x N , the matrix of "signed slopes"
cannot be semipositive.
Thus, by logical contraposition, if the matrix J de…ned through (30) happens to be semipositive at some regular interior equilibrium, then does not admit a generalized ordinal potential.
In the sequel, we will take two more steps so as to develop Lemma 4 into our most general result for the case of one-dimensional strategy spaces. First, note that the conclusion of Lemma 4, i.e., that J is not semipositive, may certainly be replaced by the less stringent conclusion that J is not inverse nonnegative. As a matter of fact, this simpli…cation will not weaken our criterion at all, essentially because case (ii) of Lemma 3 corresponds to a situation in which one may construct a strict improvement cycle with less than n players involved.
Permutations of the player set and ‡ipped strategy spaces
Second, recall that Lemma 4 looks at one particular path only. Alternative paths, corresponding to additional necessary conditions, may be constructed, e.g., by either (i) changing the order in which players change their respective strategies, or by (ii) ‡ipping around the natural order of individual strategy spaces. While the …rst concept is rather speci…c to the problem at hand, the second concept (i.e., ‡ipping around the natural order of an individual strategy space) is familiar from the theory of the oligopoly, where it has been used, in particular, to convert a two-player Cournot game with strategic substitutes into a supermodular game (Vives, 1990; Amir, 1996) .
Formally, let : N ! N be an arbitrary bijection of the set of players. Then the natural ordering 1; 2; :::; n in which the set N is run through twice in the construction of the strict improvement cycle is permuted such that the strategy change of player i takes place at position (i) rather than at position i. In other words, when 1 denotes the inverse of , player 1 (1) moves …rst, and player 1 (n) last. Below, = id will refer to the identity mapping on N , and = (i 1 i 2 :::i m ) to the round-robin permutation that maps i 1 to i 2 , i 2 to i 3 , ..., i m 1 to i m , and i m back to i 1 , leaving all remaining players unchanged. Further, denote by F N the arbitrary subset of players for which the strategy space is ‡ipped around.
It turns out that both of these operations, including combinations thereof, may be conveniently implemented by a set of pairwise sign changes applied to the slopes of players' local best-response functions. More precisely, the matrix J introduced in the statement of Lemma 4 may be replaced, without a¤ecting the validity of the lemma, by any matrix
where the entries o¤ the diagonal are given by the formula
From equation (32), it is easy to see that ‡ipping around all of the players'individual strategy spaces does not lead to any new condition, i.e., J (id;N ) = J. Moreover, a circular shift of the players forward by one position is equivalent to ‡ipping around player n's strategy space only, i.e., J ((12:::n);?) = J (id;fng) . Taking account of such redundancies, however, a total of (n 1)!2 n 1 independent conditions remain. Some of these will prove useful below.
A more general result
Recall that a principal submatrix of a square matrix A 2 R n n is a submatrix e A 2 R m m , for some m 2 f1; :::; ng, that is obtained from A by deleting n m pairs of corresponding rows and columns. In particular, A is a principal submatrix of itself. Summarizing the discussion so far, we arrive at the following extension of Proposition 1.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the smooth game admits a generalized ordinal potential. Then, at any regular interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium x N , the matrix J = J(x N ) de…ned through (30) does not possess an inverse nonnegative principal submatrix. Moreover, the same is true if J is replaced by any matrix J ( ;F ) = J ( ;F ) (x N ) where players have been renamed using an arbitrary bijection : N ! N , and where an arbitrary subset F N of individual strategy spaces have been ‡ipped around.
Illustrations of how Lemma 5 sharpens the conclusion of Proposition 1 will be given below. The following example shows, however, that the conclusion of Lemma 5 boils down to the conclusion of Proposition 1 in the case of two players (i.e., the earlier restriction to strict improvement cycles running over the edges of a square was indeed innocuous).
Example 1. It is obvious that the two one-dimensional principal submatrices of
are not inverse nonnegative. The condition that J itself is inverse nonnegative is that J is nonsingular, with all entries of the inverse matrix being nonnegative. Because of
23 By ‡ipping around the strategy space of exactly one of the two players (i.e., by letting F = f1g or F = f2g, and = id), or alternatively by changing the order of moves (i.e., F = ? and = (12)), one may assure oneself that the sign condition on the individual slopes may be dropped without loss. Thus, we return to the criterion captured by Proposition 1, viz. that the inequality 12 (x N ) 21 (x N ) < 0 is incompatible with the existence of a generalized ordinal potential for .
The second necessary condition
Statement of the result
While Lemma 5 is quite general, it is also desirable to know less stringent conditions that can be applied more readily to speci…c games. In this section, we therefore derive a second set of conditions that are necessary for the existence of a generalized ordinal potential in a given game with continuous strategy spaces. In contrast to the pairwise strategic substitutes or 23 Indeed, suppose that J is inverse nonnegative with 12 (x N ) 21 (x N ) > 0. Then, since all entries of J 1 must be nonnegative, 12 (x N ) 0 and 21 (x N ) 0, so that 12 (x N ) 21 (x N ) 0, which is impossible.
complements condition appearing in Proposition 1, the conditions introduced in the following result impose restrictions on the slopes of local best-response functions (or, more generally, cross-derivatives) of at least three players.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the smooth game with more than two players admits a generalized ordinal potential. Then, at any regular interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium x N , and for any set fi 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 g N of pairwise di¤erent players,
Moreover, for any set of pairwise distinct players fi 1 ; ::::; i m g N with m 4,
provided that i 1 i 3 (x N ) 6 = 0; :::; i 1 i m 1 (x N ) 6 = 0 and i 3 i 1 (x N ) 6 = 0; :::
Thus, the product of pairwise slopes of the local best-response functions over an arbitrary cycle of three players remains unchanged if the order in which the cycle is run through is reversed.
Moreover, this result extends to cycles of length four and beyond provided that a certain slopes of players'local best-response functions are all nonzero.
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For exact potential games, the conclusion of Proposition 2 may be checked directly. For instance, for an exact potential game with n = 3 players, Lemma 1 implies
as claimed. Obviously, this argument extends in a straightforward way to more than three players and likewise to the case of weighted potential games.
For the class of ordinal potential games in which payo¤s are given by
it is again the symmetry relationship
derived in equations (16-18) that allows the same conclusion.
Proposition 2 shows that these properties hold, more generally, for any generalized ordinal potential game. The result is actually somewhat unexpected, because the rather in ‡exible equality constraints (35-36) follow from a set of assumptions that are entirely of an ordinal nature.
A way to reformulate and summarize the conclusions of Propositions 1 and 2, essentially without losing any mileage, 25 is the following, beforementioned result.
Corollary 1. Consider an interior regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium x N in a smooth game such that all slopes f ij (x N ) : i; j 2 N s.t. i 6 = jg are nonzero. If admits a generalized ordinal potential, then there exist positive weights w 1 (x N ) > 0; :::; w n (x N ) > 0 such that
Thus, as discussed in the Introduction, the existence of an ordinal potential implies a local property that is reminiscent of the global condition for a weighted potential game.
Illustrations
We will illustrate Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 with the help of two additional examples. These are a search model of the Diamond-type, which extends an example in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , and a model of horizontally di¤erentiated price competition. The …rst example will also allow us to settle an earlier question regarding strict improvement cycles that do not simply follow the edges of a rectangular box.
Consider …rst the following search model. Each of n players i = 1; :::; n chooses a search e¤ort x i 0 at costs C i (x i ), and receives a payo¤ u i (x 1 ; :::;
25 That is, Corollary 1 implies both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 in the case of nonzero slopes.
where ij 6 = 0 measures player i's expected bene…t (or damage) resulting from a random encounter with player j, and b i 2 R is player i's intrinsic marginal valuation of search e¤ort.
Note that it is not assumed here that the game is supermodular. We shall assume, however, that the cost functions are quadratic for all players, i.e., that C i (x i ) = c i x 2 i for some c i > 0.
Suppose that an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists. Then, by Corollary 1, the search game admits a generalized ordinal potential only if there are factors w 1 > 0; :::; w n > 0 such that ij w i = ji w j for all i and j with j 6 = i. However, that condition is equivalent to the existence of a weighted potential. Hence, given that being a weighted potential game is more stringent than being a generalized ordinal potential game, the condition of Corollary 1 is actually seen to be tight also in this case.
Relatedly, returning to the discussion adjourned at the end of Section 3, for any given interior strategy pro…le x N , and arbitrary nonzero slopes f ij (x N ) 6 = 0 : j 6 = ig, the pro…le x N is easily seen to be a regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the search model for parameters
. Therefore, the conditions on the slopes of the local best-response functions obtained in Corollary 1 cannot be tightened any further in this speci…c class of games. Since the consideration of local strict improvement cycles of arbitrary shape can only lead to slope conditions that apply regardless of the speci…c game at hand, this implies that the consideration of local strict improvement cycles of arbitrary shape in arbitrary smooth games indeed does not lead to additional insights over those already obtained.
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Next, consider the following model of Bertrand-style competition between n …rms i = 1; :::; n with di¤erentiated products. Suppose that each …rm i 2 N chooses a price x i (keeping the notation for convenience), and subsequently sells a quantity
where Q i > 0, s i > 0, and ij 6 = 0 are parameters. Firm i's production cost is represented by a convex and twice continuously di¤erentiable function i . Thus, …rm i's pro…t reads
The conditions for the existence of an exact potential may be derived in a straightforward way.
Speci…cally, the cross-derivative of …rm i's pro…t with respect to …rm j is given by
Hence, from Lemma 1, the price-setting game admits an exact potential if and only if
In particular, all cost functions need to be (at most) quadratic. Even though this is a classic example, little was known about the possibility of a generalized ordinal potential. Suppose that the price-setting game allows an interior equilibrium x N . Then, from Proposition 2, we obtain a necessary condition that is less stringent than (46), viz. that
holds for any set fi 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 g of pairwise di¤erent …rms. Thus, if price externalities are generic (in the sense that equation (47) fails to hold for some triplet fi 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 g of pairwise di¤erent …rms, then the price-setting game with more than two …rms does not admit a generalized ordinal potential. Clearly, the same conclusion may be drawn if any of the analogues of equation (47) fails to hold for any m 4.
Some speci…c classes of games
The purpose of this section is it to characterize the restrictions that our necessary conditions impose in three speci…c classes of games. By necessary conditions, we mean here throughout the strongest-form necessary conditions summarized in Lemma 5.
Sum-aggregative games
In a sum-aggregative game (e.g., Corchón, 1994) , each player i's payo¤ function may be written as u i (x i ; x i ) = U i (x i ; x i ) for some function U i on X i R, where x i = P j6 =i x j . Examples include Cournot games and contests (such as the one considered above). We claim that the consideration of strict improvement cycles involving any number of players yields no conclusions on top of what Proposition 1 would deliver. To see this, note that, at any pro…le x N from the interior of X N , the payo¤ representation of the sum-aggregative game implies
for any set fi; j; kg of pairwise di¤erent players. Therefore, at any interior regular equilibrium
x N , the slopes of the local best-response functions satisfy ij (x N ) i (x N ) for any two players i and j with j 6 = i. Consequently, the matrix J = J(x N ) de…ned through (30) attains the particular form
To see under what conditions this matrix is semipositive, it clearly su¢ ces to restrict attention to the case where i (x N ) 6 = 0 for all i 2 N . Since we are interested in conclusions that go beyond those of Proposition 1, we may even assume that i (x N ) j (x N ) > 0 for any two players i and j with j 6 = i. But then, all slopes are nonzero and of the same sign, so that J may be rescaled into a skew-symmetric matrix by multiplying it from the left with a positive diagonal matrix. Thus, J cannot be semipositive. 27 Moreover, the conclusion of skew-symmetry does not change when we permute the player set or ‡ip around individual strategy spaces.
The discussion may be summarized as follows.
Corollary 2. A smooth sum-aggregative game satis…es the necessary conditions for the 27 Indeed, a skew-symmetric matrix is never semipositive. To see this, suppose that A 2 R n n is semipositive. Then, there exists N 2 R n with N > 0 such that A N > 0. Hence, if A is also skew-symmetric, A T = A, so that A T N = A N < 0. However, by the Theorem of the Alternative (Johnson et al., 1994, Th. 2.9) , this is impossible.
existence of a generalized ordinal potential if and only if exhibits, at any interior regular equilibrium, either strategic complements or strategic substitutes.
Symmetric games
A game is symmetric if all players have the same strategy space X X 1 = ::: = X N , and if, for any permutation : N ! N of the player set, payo¤s satisfy u i (x 1 ; :::; x n ) = u (i) (x (1) ; :::; x (n) ) (i 2 N; (x 1 ; :::; x n ) 2 X N ).
Furthermore, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium x N = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) is symmetric if x 1 = ::: = x N .
Smooth symmetric games admit at least one symmetric equilibrium under standard assumptions (Moulin, 1986, p. 115) . 28 Therefore the following observation may be useful.
Corollary 3. In any smooth symmetric game , the necessary conditions for the existence of a generalized ordinal potential are automatically satis…ed at any symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
For instance, it is known that any symmetric game with one-dimensional strategy spaces and best-response functions that have a slope globally strictly above negative one admits at most one Cournot-Nash equilibrium (Vives, 1999) . Since the equilibrium is necessarily symmetric in that case, such games satisfy our necessary conditions as well.
Zero-sum games
As usual, we call a two-player game zero-sum if u 1 (x N ) + u 2 (x N ) = 0 for all x N 2 X N . For this case, Proposition 1 yields the following noteworthy implication. Thus, if players' reaction curves always intersect at a right angle that is aligned with the coordinate system (as it is the case in a symmetric two-player zero-sum game, for instance), then the necessary conditions for the existence of a generalized ordinal potential hold. Conversely, no generalized ordinal potential is feasible in a two-player zero-sum game if the tangents to the players'reaction curves are not parallel to the coordinate axes at any point of intersection.
Corollary 4 extends to two-player games that are strategically zero-sum in the sense of Moulin and Vial (1978) , i.e., to games such that u 1 (x N ) + u 2 (x N ) is additively separable in x 1 and x 2 . In particular, this is an alternative way to look at the contest example discussed above.
Extensions
Multi-dimensional strategy spaces
Below, we will brie ‡y summarize the adaptions that need to be made to accommodate multidimensional strategy spaces. In fact, as it turns out, the extension of the necessary conditions is mainly a matter of notation.
In the case of one-dimensional strategy spaces, the most general condition for the existence of a strict improvement cycle required the existence of a vector N = ( 1 ; :::; n ) T 2 R n with 
The bene…t of this reformulation is that condition (51) 
i ; :::;
., a direction of change for the unilateral change of strategy by player i in the strict improvement cycle), and correspondingly, each cross derivative For example, in the case of n = 2 players with d 1 = d 2 = 2, the semipositivity condition (allowing for ‡ipped strategy spaces) must be replaced by the condition that there exist vectors
1 ;
(2) 1 ) T and 2 = (
2 ;
2 ) T such that
where
denotes the beforementioned matrix of cross-derivatives. The corresponding conditions for either more than two involved players or strategy spaces of dimension larger than two may now be found by straightforward extension. Using this notation, the proof of Lemma 4 extends in a straightforward way.
Non-local strict improvement cycles
The approach of this paper extends to non-local strict improvement cycles, where the role of the interior equilibrium is taken over by a cyclic path along which the generalized ordinal potential stays constant. We illustrate the basic idea with an example, featuring two players and onedimensional strategy spaces. Suppose that x N = (x 1 ; x 2 ) and x
2 ) are two interior strategy pro…les such that
In other words, the …nite sequence
is a cyclic path along which the player that changes her strategy keeps an unchanged payo¤.
Consider now a perturbation of the pro…les, say
for " > 0 small, and for an arbitrary vector # = ( 1 ;
small, the …nite sequence
is a strict improvement cycle provided that the following conditions hold:
In particular, if admits a generalized ordinal potential, then the matrix
must not be semipositive. Moreover, an analogous conclusion is obtained for any matrix derived from r(x N ; x + N ) by multiplying an arbitrary subset of the column vectors with negative one. Thus, an extension to non-local cycles is indeed feasible.
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Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have identi…ed tight conditions necessary for the existence of a generalized ordinal potential in any given game with continuous strategy spaces and twice continuously di¤erentiable payo¤ functions. Since every ordinal game is, in particular, a generalized ordinal potential game, the same conditions are equally crucial for the existence of an ordinal potential.
In this sense, a (partial) di¤erentiable characterization of these important classes of games has been accomplished.
We have used our criteria to prove the non-existence of generalized ordinal potentials in a variety of classic games, including probabilistic all-pay contests with heterogeneous valuations, mixed oligopoly, and quantity competition with a dominant …rm. Parameter constraints have been obtained for a search model and a di¤erentiated Bertrand game with more than two …rms.
Besides illustrating the usefulness of the conditions, these applications allow to see some of the economic implications of ordinal potential concepts.
Our results imply, in particular, that the class of concave games (Rosen, 1965) is not contained in the class of generalized ordinal potential games. 30 While both concepts impose related restrictions on second-order derivatives, viz. negative quaside…niteness of the Jacobian in the case of concave games and not semipositivity of the sign-modi…ed Jacobian in the case of generalized ordinal potential games, the relationship is actually rather loose. For instance, in a smooth two-player game with payo¤ functions that are strictly concave in own strategy, negative 29 One might speculate whether the kernel of the matrix r(x N ; x + N ) contains information about the isoquants of any ordinal potential. Numerical investigations suggest, however, that unless isoquants are elliptic, r(x N ; x + N ) will be invertible. Intuitively, this means that there typically does not exist a nearby "constant-payo¤ cycle"of the same length. 30 Conversely, however, it is well-known that any smooth game admitting a twice continuously di¤erentiable exact potential function whose Hessian is globally negative de…nite is a concave game. See, e.g., Neyman (1997) , Ui (2008) , and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009). quaside…niteness of the Jacobian is tantamount to
Thus, mixed signs of mutual cross-derivatives at an interior equilibrium are feasible in a concave
game, yet as noted above, not in a generalized ordinal potential game.
Clearly, our …ndings may also be conducive to the identi…cation of new classes of ordinal potential games. In particular, we have shown that necessary conditions in the strongest form are satis…ed by three important classes of games, which may be informally described as (i) sumaggregative games with either increasing or decreasing best-response functions, (ii) symmetric games in which best-response functions have everywhere slopes strictly exceeding negative one, and (iii) symmetric two-person zero-sum games. This allows for the theoretical possibility that some of these games might indeed admit a generalized ordinal potential.
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A somewhat unexpected feature of the analysis is re ‡ected in the equality constraints that apply to smooth generalized ordinal potential games with more than two players. After all, the assumptions driving the equality constraints are of a purely ordinal nature, while the implications are nongeneric in nature. We have no simple intuition for this …nding.
Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs of our results. For the proofs of the known facts summarized above as Lemmas 1 through 3, the reader is referred to Monderer and Shapley (1996a , Th. 4.5), Voorneveld (1997 , Lemma 2.1), and Johnson et al. (1994 , respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1. By contradiction. Suppose that, at some interior regular equilibrium
x N , and for some players i and j with j 6 = i, we have ij (x N ) ji (x N ) < 0. By renaming players, if necessary, we may assume that ji (x N ) < 0 < ij (x N ). Thus, player i's local best-response 31 Preliminary research by the author on the construction of ordinal potentials in smooth games strongly suggests that the necessary conditions identi…ed in the present paper are indicative regarding su¢ ciency as well. However, unfortunately, the matter of su¢ ciency is highly involved. For example, the pseudo-and best-reply potentials ingeniously constructed in prior work (Huang, 2002; Dubey et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010) need not be generalized ordinal potentials in general. Because of such di¢ culties, it has to remain feasible for the time being that the restrictions implied by the existence of a generalized ordinal potential are even more restrictive than the necessary conditions identi…ed in the present analysis.
function around x N is strictly increasing in x j , whereas player j's local best-response function around x N is strictly declining in x i (i.e., just as shown in Figure 1 ), with
It is claimed now that, for any su¢ ciently small " > 0, the payo¤ di¤erence corresponding to the upper side of the square satis…es
To prove this, we determine the …rst and second derivatives of the function + i ("), and evaluate at " = 0. As for the …rst derivative, one obtains
Evaluating at " = 0, and subsequently exploiting the necessary …rst-order condition for player i at the interior equilibrium x N , we …nd
Next, consider the second derivative of
Invoking Schwarz's theorem regarding the equality of cross-derivatives for twice continuously di¤erentiable functions, and subsequently using (68), one …nds
In sum, (71) and (74) imply that, indeed, + i (") > 0 for any su¢ ciently small " > 0. Analogous arguments can be used to deal with the other three sides of the square. Speci…cally, one de…nes
j (") = u j (x j + "; x i "; x i;j ) u j (x j "; x i "; x i;j ),
and now readily veri…es that
and that
It follows that
, and j (") > 0 all hold for " > 0 small enough. But then, the …nite sequence (19) is a strict improvement cycle, which is incompatible with the existence of a generalized ordinal potential by Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 4. A semipositive matrix remains semipositive after multiplication from the left or right with any positive diagonal matrix (Johnson et al., 1994, p. 267) . Therefore, the semipositivity of J is equivalent to the semipositivity of the matrix
which is constructed from the Jacobian of by replacing all diagonal entries by zero and by multiplying all entries above the diagonal with negative one. Suppose now that J is semipositive, so that J is semipositive as well. Then, by de…nition, there exists a vector N = ( 1 ; :::; n ) T 2 R with N > 0 such that J N > 0. Consider now the …nite sequence ::: ! x (1;+) N (") = (x 1 + 1 "; x 2 2 "; x 3 3 "; :::; x n 1 n 1 "; x n n ") ! ! x (2;+) N (") = (x 1 + 1 "; x 2 + 2 "; x 3 3 "; :::; x n 1 n 1 "; x n n ") ! . . . ! x (n;+) N (") = (x 1 + 1 "; x 2 + 2 "; x 3 + 3 "; :::; x n 1 + n 1 "; x n + n ") !
! x (1; ) N (") = (x 1 1 "; x 2 + 2 "; x 3 + 3 "; :::; x n 1 + n 1 "; x n + n ") ! ! x (2; ) N (") = (x 1 1 "; x 2 2 "; x 3 + 3 "; :::; x n 1 + n 1 "; x n + n ") ! . . . ! x (n; ) N (") = (x 1 1 "; x 2 2 "; x 3 3 "; :::; x n 1 n 1 "; x n n ") ! :::,
where " > 0 is a small constant as before. To establish (i), proceed precisely as in the proof of Proposition 1, and consider the …rst two derivatives of the payo¤ di¤erence
= u 1 (x 1 + 1 "; x 2 2 "; x 3 3 "; :::; x n 1 n 1 "; x n n ")
u 1 (x 1 1 "; x 2 2 "; x 3 3 "; :::; x n 1 n 1 "; x n n ")
at " = 0. The …rst derivative of (1;+) (") at " = 0 is given by
Hence, from player 1's …rst-order condition,
Next, one considers the second derivative of (1;+) (") at " = 0, i.e.,
Collecting terms, one obtains
Thus, using 1 > 0, and recalling that the signs in the …rst of the n inequalities in the system J N > 0 are all negative, one arrives at
It follows that (1;+) (") > 0 for any " > 0 su¢ ciently small, which proves (i). To verify claims
(ii) through (iv), de…ne payo¤ di¤erences
) (i = 2; :::; n).
Using the players'necessary …rst-order conditions, it is straightforward to validate that
Moreover, for i = 2; :::; n, calculations analogous to (91) yield
where the inequality corresponding to player i's strategy change corresponds precisely to the i's inequality in the system J N > 0. Finally, one notes that, since d( "
In sum, this clearly proves (ii) through (iv). Thus, there exists a strict improvement cycle in . Since this is impossible, the lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 5. Take a bijection : N ! N and a subset F N . Suppose that players have been renamed corresponding to , so that 1 (1) moves …rst and 1 (n) moves last, and the strategy spaces of the players in F have been ‡ipped around. Suppose …rst that F = ?. Then, if a strict improvement cycle corresponding to ( ; F ) can be constructed, Lemma 4 implies that the matrix
is semipositive. De…ne the n n permutation matrix = f ij g with entries ij = 1 if j = (i) and ij = 0 if j 6 = (i). Then it can be checked that
Since semipositivity of a matrix is not a¤ected by multiplication from the right or left with a permutation matrix (Johnson et al., 1994, p. 267) , J ( ;?) (x N ) is semipositive. To complete the proof, it su¢ ces to note that the slope ij (x N ) changes sign when precisely one of the two strategy spaces of players i and j is ‡ipped around.
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix a regular interior equilibrium x N of the generalized ordinal potential game . To prove the …rst claim, let fi 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 g be any triplet of pairwise di¤erent players. Clearly, one may rename the players such that i 1 = 1, i 2 = 2, and i 3 = 3. Suppose …rst that exhibits either strategic complements or strategic substitutes at x N . Thus, we assume 32 E.g., let = (123). Then, with i counting rows and j counting columns,
Therefore,
consistent with relationship (108).
that either ij (x N ) 0 for all i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g with j 6 = i (in the case of strategic complements), or ij (x N ) 0 for all i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g with j 6 = i (in the case of strategic substitutes). In this case, one ‡ips around player 2's strategy space, yet leaves unchanged the order in which the …nite sequence is run through (i.e., = id and F = f2g). Then, by Lemma 5, the modi…ed matrix
cannot be inverse nonnegative. To prove (35), it su¢ ces to show that the determinant of J 3 ,
vanishes. To provoke a contradiction, suppose …rst that jJ 3 j > 0. Then, from the temporary assumption of either strategic complements or strategic substitutes at x N , all the entries of the matrix inverse of J 3 ,
are nonnegative, in contradiction to the earlier conclusion that J 3 is not inverse nonnegative.
Hence, jJ 3 j 0. Suppose next that jJ 3 j < 0. Then, by running through the same path in the opposite direction (e.g., by letting = (13) and F = f2g), one obtains from Lemma 5 that
is not inverse nonnegative. The matrix inverse of J 0 3 is consequently given by (J 0 3 ) 1 = (J 3 ) 1 .
Hence, in this case, recalling (111) and jJ 3 j < 0, all entries of (J 0 3 ) 1 are nonnegative, in contradiction to the fact that J 0 3 is not inverse nonnegative. It follows that jJ 3 j = 0, which proves the …rst claim in the case where exhibits either strategic complements or strategic substitutes at x N . Next, we drop the assumption that exhibits either strategic complements or strategic substitutes at x N . From Proposition 1, we know, however, that exhibits pairwise strategic complements or substitutes at x N . Hence, up to another renaming of the players, there are only two cases:
(i) Strategic complements at x N between player 1 and each of players 2 and 3, as well as strategic substitutes at x N between players 2 and 3;
(ii) Strategic substitutes at x N between player 1 and each of players 2 and 3, as well as strategic complements at x N between players 2 and 3.
In either case, by ‡ipping around the strategy space of player 1, the game may be transformed into a game that exhibits either strategic substitutes at x N or strategic complements at x N .
Since the operation of ‡ipping around individual strategy spaces does not a¤ect the validity of equation (35) 
Taking the respective products of the left-hand and right-hand sides of these equations yields 
as claimed. This concludes the induction argument, and therefore proves the proposition.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let x N be an interior regular Nash equilibrium such that ij (x N ) 6 = 0 for all i 6 = j. We need to …nd positive constants w 1 (x N ) > 0; :::; w n (x N ) > 0 such that ij (x N )w i (x N ) = ji (x N )w j (x N ) (i; j 2 N; j 6 = i).
It is claimed that w i (x N ) = (j 12 (x N )j ::: j i 1i (x N )j) (j i+1i (x N )j ::: j nn 1 (x N )j) (i 2 N )
does the job. Clearly, it su¢ ces to check (117) for i < j. Splitting the product in the second bracket of (118), and plugging the result into the left-hand side of (117), one obtains ij (x N )w i (x N ) = (j 12 (x N )j ::: j i 1i (x N )j) sgn( ij (x N )) j i+1i (x N )j ::: j jj 1 (x N )j j ij (x N )j (119) (j j+1j (x N )j ::: j nn 1 (x N )j) .
From Proposition 1 and the assumption that slopes do not vanish, sgn( ij (x N )) = sgn( ji (x N )).
Moreover, from Proposition 2,
i+1i (x N ) ::: jj 1 (x N ) ij (x N ) = ii+1 (x N ) :::
Plugging (120) and (121) 
This proves the claim and, hence, the corollary.
Proof of Corollary 2. See the text before the corollary.
Proof of Corollary 3. It su¢ ces to note that, at any symmetric equilibrium x N , the matrix J ( ;F ) (x N ) is skew-symmetric for any bijection : N ! N and for any subset F N . 
Hence, sgn( 12 (x N )) = sgn( 21 (x N )), and consequently 12 (x N ) = 21 (x N ) = 0. (If) Immediate.
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